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A THEORY OF DIVIDED GOVERNMENT1 
BY ALBERTO ALESINA AND HOWARD ROSENTHAL 
This paper extends the spatial theory of voting to an institutional structure in which 
policy choices depend upon not only the executive but also the composition of the 
legislature. Voters have incentives to be strategic since policy reflects the outcome of a 
simultaneous election of the legislature and the executive and since the legislature's 
impact on policy depends upon relative plurality. To analyze equilibrium in this game 
between voters, we apply "coalition proof' type refinements. The model has several 
testable implications which are consistent with voting behavior in the United States. For 
instance, the model predicts: (a) split-tickets where some voters vote for one party for 
president and the other for congress; (b) for some parameter values, a divided government 
with different parties controlling the executive and the majority of the legislature; and (c) 
the midterm electoral cycle with the party holding the presidency always losing votes in 
midterm congressional elections. 
KEYWORDS: Voting theory, checks and balances, conditional sincerity, midterm cycle, 
coalition proof Nash equilibria. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
NATIONAL POLICIES TYPICALLY REFLECT the composition of both the executive 
and the legislature. In the United States, for instance, the administration's 
influence on policy is affected by the composition of congress. 
Traditional spatial models of elections ignore this institutional complexity and 
assume that the winner of a two-party race fully controls policy.2 These models 
focus on the strategic interaction between the candidates and treat each voter as 
a passive player, voting for the candidate offering the more preferred policy. 
In our model, instead, the voters face two parties with preferences defined on 
policy outcomes (Wittman (1977, 1990), Calvert (1985), Alesina (1988)). Without 
"checks" by the legislature, the executives representing the two parties pursue 
distinct and polarized policies.3 However, policy outcomes in our model are a 
function not only of which party holds the executive but also of the composition 
of the legislature. 
The ideal policies of the two parties are identified by two points on an 
interval; voters to the left of the left party's policy always vote for this party in 
both the legislative and presidential elections; similarly, voters on the right of 
1 This work was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SES-8821441. Alesina also 
gratefully acknowledges upport from the Sloan Foundation. An earlier version of this paper was 
circulated with the title "Moderating Elections." We thank Geir Asheim, Michael Whinston, a 
co-editor, and the referees for extremely helpful comments. The manuscript was revised while 
Rosenthal was a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. 
2 For example, see Kramer (1973). For surveys of this literature, see Enelow and Hinich (1984) 
and Ordeshook (1986). 
3The existence of "polarization" in American politics has been widely documented by Poole and 
Rosenthal (1984a,b; 1991). 
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the right party have a dominant strategy to vote for the right party. In contrast, 
voters with ideal policies intermediate between the positions of the parties take 
advantage of the institutional structure of "checks and balances" to moderate 
the executive and achieve a policy outcome closer to their ideal. This realistic 
feature of the model implies strategic voting. Unlike the traditional spatial 
model, the decision of each "middle-of-the-road" voter depends upon his beliefs 
about the behavior of other voters. Thus we examine strategic voting in the 
context of the "new institutionalism's" concern about the executive-legislative 
interaction (Shepsle (1986), Hammond and Miller (1988), Fiorina (1990, 1991)).4 
Our model of "moderating behavior" has implications consistent with three 
observations concerning American politics: split-ticket voting, the midterm cycle, 
and divided government. The model predicts split-ticket voting when the execu- 
tive and the legislature are elected simultaneously. That is, some voters support 
different parties in the two elections to, say, counterbalance a president on the 
right with a legislature on the left. The model also captures the persistent 
phenomenon of the "midterm voting cycle." In midterm congressional elections, 
the president's party loses plurality relative to the preceding congressional 
elections held simultaneously with the presidential election. Our explanation 
relies upon the fact that in presidential election years the electorate faces 
uncertainty about who will win the presidency. Moderate voters want neither a 
left-dominated congress for fear that the president may turn out to be left, nor a 
right-dominated congress lest the president be right. Their uncertainty about the 
outcome of the presidential election leads them to prefer a "hedged" congress. 
At midterm, once the identity of the president is known, voters move congress 
further in the direction opposite to that of the president in order to achieve 
better moderation. Empirical studies by Alesina and Rosenthal (1989), Erikson 
(1990), and Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993) have shown that this 
model of the midterm effect performs at least as well and often better than 
traditional empirical voting models that emphasize incumbency advantage and 
retrospective voting based on the state of the economy.5 A sufficiently strong 
midterm cycle or substantial split-ticket voting will produce divided government 
where the party holding the presidency does not have a majority in the 
legislature. 
We present both a complete information and an incomplete information 
model. In the former, but not the latter, the distribution of voter ideal points is 
common knowledge. Split-ticket voting, moderating behavior, and divided gov- 
4Cox (1987) analyzes strategic voting when voters decide more than one contest in the context of 
the double-member districts of Victorian England. He finds evidence of substantial split-ticket 
voting until cabinet government is instituted. With cabinet government, policy depends only on a 
parliamentary majority and not on, as in the American system, an executive-legislative interaction 
that is affected by the composition of the legislature. The virtual disappearance of split-ticket voting 
under cabinet government is expected from the perspective of our model. 
5Erikson (1988) tests coattails and other alternative explanations of the midterm cycle and finds 
that they are not supported by the data. 
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emnment, present in both cases, can be more easily illustrated with the complete 
information model.6 A midterm cycle emerges only in the incomplete informa- 
tion model. The Alesina and Rosenthal (1995, pp. 43-120) volume, written after 
the initial draft of this paper, motivates these models using the concept of 
conditional sincerity briefly discussed in Section 3.2 of this paper but does not 
analyze equilibrium using the game-theoretic concepts of abstract stable sets 
and coalition proof Nash equilibrium. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the one-period 
model and the game-theoretic solution concepts which we employ. We analyze 
equilibrium in this basic model in Section 3. This section uses rather general 
assumptions about functional forms. In Section 4 we present the two-period 
complete information case with more restrictive assumptions. In Section 5 we 
discuss the incomplete information version of the model for specific functional 
forms. Section 6 concludes. 
2. THE ONE-PERIOD MODEL 
2.1. Preferences and Institutional Setup 
We consider a two-party system in which the parties (identified with the 
candidates) have policy preferences. In particular, the two parties, labelled D 
and R, and the voters have unidimensional, continuous, and strictly concave 
utility functions over a single policy issue. Utility functions are all identical 
except for the bliss point. The utility of a policy x is given as 
(1) u1 = U(X, 0i) 
where, for the two parties, we denote the bliss points as OD and OR with 
0 < OD < OR < 1 and, for the generic voter i, we denote the bliss point as Oi. 
There is a continuum of voters. The bliss point cumulative distribution H(O) is 
continuous and strictly increasing on the interval I = [0,1]. The median type is 
denoted ,u = H-1 (0.5). Any non-null subset, S, of I is termed a coalition. The 
preferences of both parties and voters are common knowledge. We choose to 
work with a continuum of voters rather than with a finite number for reasons of 
technical convenience clarified in footnote 13, following Proposition 2 below. 
The president is elected by majority vote. If the executive had complete 
control of policy, the party winning the presidency would adopt its ideal policy 
6 Fiorina (1988) proposed a model of split-ticket voting which is related to ours; however there 
are three important differences between the models. Fiorina's specification allows for only four 
policy outcomes, corresponding to the four combinations of parties holding the executive and the 
majority in the legislature, while we allow for a continuum of policies. Second, and more impor- 
tantly, Fiorina does not consider strategic voting. Third, since Fiorina's model has only one period, 
he does not address the midterm cycle. 
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(OD or OR).7 However, the institutional structure of our model posits that policy 
is determined by a compromise between the president and the legislature, which 
is elected by strict proportional representation in a single national district. 
Let us define Vj, j = D, R, to be the proportion of votes obtained by party j in 
the legislative elections. Since we assume full turnout, VR = 1 - VD. The policies, 
xD and XR, that result when D and R, respectively, hold the presidency, are 
given by 
(2) X = 0D +9D(VR) 
(3) X = OR-gR(1 -VR), 
where gj( ), j E {D, R}, is continuous, strictly increasing in its argument with 
g1(O) = 0, and is common knowledge. Equations (2) and (3) capture the idea that 
policy outcomes are further from the president's ideal policy the greater the 
opposition's share in the legislature. Since the functions gj( ) can be nonlinear, 
they can be very "steep" at VR = 2, that is at the point where the majority in the 
legislature changes hands.8 We assume 
(4) OD +9D(VR) < OR-g9R(1 - VR) 
which implies that, for VR fixed, 
(5) OD <XD <XR < OR. 
Condition (5) states that, realistically, for a given level of the legislative vote, 
policy is always more "left" when D is president than when R is president. 
We now specify a one-period game in which both the president and the 
legislature are elected simultaneously. In Section 4 we extend the model to a 
two-period case in which the president serves for two periods while the legisla- 
ture is elected every period. 
2.2. The Game 
Each voter i chooses strategy zi specified as a pair z lz7 E Z_ 
{DD, DR, RD, RR}, where zi refers to the presidential election and Z2 to the 
legislative. We treat only pure strategies in the text. In the Appendix, we show 
that this restriction is inconsequential. Let Z' be the Cartesian product of 
the Zi and Z = Z1Z2 be an element of ZI. Without loss of generality, we limit 
7In a two party regime without institutidnal checks and balances, this is the one-shot equilibrium 
to the electoral game described in Alesina (1988). In fact, no other policy announced prior to 
elections would be implemented by the elected party, given that the party can choose its ideal policy 
when in office. Thus, rational voters would not believe in any announcement other than the party 
ideal policy. 
8 In fact, all our complete information results hold in the discontinuous, majoritarian setup of 
Fiorina (1988) described in footnote 6. (See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995, pp. 66-71).) We feel, 
however, that the continuous model is more realistic, especially for the United States, where the 
filibuster and other features of the legislative landscape enhance the power of minorities. 
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attention to measurable strategy constellations z. Consequently, MRZ 
({i: i eI and z =R}) and VRZ c-({i: i e I and z =R}) are well defined, 
where o(S) denotes the Lebesque measure of a set S. Let Pz(MRz) denote the 
probability, specified by the electoral law, that R is president: 
1 
If mRz > - I Pz = 1 (majority for R president), 2' 
1 
if MRZ < -2 Pz = 0 (majority for D president), 2' 
if MRZ = - Pz = P, 0 < P < 1 (tied presidential vote). 
This specification allows for different tie-breaking rules, including the toss of a 
fair coin. 
For simplicity, in the remainder of the text, we assume R wins the presidency 
if the vote is tied; that is, P = 1 if MRZ = 2.9 If 0 < P < 1 when MRZ = 2, our 
results also go through. (The proof, in Alesina and Rosenthal (1993), the 
working paper version of this paper, is available upon request.) We define the 
indicator variable Jz by 
1 
Jz=D if MRZ<-, 
1 
R if MRZ2 2 . 
For any z, the policy outcomes can be determined by substituting VRZ for VR 
in (2) or (3). Utilities are then determined by (1). 
While our analysis allows for all measurable z, it is useful to define "cutpoint" 
strategies. 
DEFINITION: If there exists 0 such that voters in a coalition S with Oi < 0 
vote D and voters with Oi > 0 vote R in an electoral contest, 0 is called a 
cutpoint on S (of z) for the contest.10 If a strategy constellation z can be 
represented by both a presidential cutpoint on S, denoted 0, and a legislative 
cutpoint on S, denoted 0, z is a cutpoint strategy on S. 
For brevity, when S= I, we refer to z simply as a "cutpoint strategy." A 
cutpoint strategy has at most three types of voters. For instance, if 0< 0, we 
have DD voters who have ideal points below 0, RD voters who have ideal points 
A 
between 0 and 0, and RR voters who have ideal points above 0. 
9By symmetry, nothing changes when a tie goes to D. 
10 The voter type O, = 0 is uninfluential because of zero measure. 
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2.3. The Need for a Refinement 
We must apply a refinement of the Nash concept to our game to address 
three problems engendered by our model. 
The first problem arises from our institutional structure incorporating simul- 
taneous election of the executive and the legislature and proportional represen- 
tation. In standard two-candidate models, voters are simply assumed to vote for 
their more preferred candidate. That is, voters are sincere. In game-theoretic 
terms, the refinement of elimination of weakly dominated strategies solves the 
multiple equilibria problems associated with the "all or none" feature of a 
two-candidate election. 
In our setup, (5) implies that voters in [0, OD] have DD as a weakly dominant 
strategy and those in [OR, 1] have RR. In contrast, those in (OD, OR) do not have 
weakly dominant strategies because the simultaneity of the presidential and 
legislative votes means that a "best response" for a voter in one contest depends 
on the outcome of the other. For example, in the presidential election, the 
legislative vote influences the choice between D and R since XD and XR are 
functions of the legislative vote. There is only weak dominance in the presiden- 
tial component in a conditional sense. All voters have weakly dominant strate- 
gies, conditional on the legislative vote. Moreover, in the legislative elections, 
proportional representation causes even conditional weak dominance to vanish. 
Since VR is continuous, one's "best response" in the legislative component will 
depend on both the legislative and presidential components used by other 
voters. 
The second problem arises because there is a continuum of voters. If an 
individual voter's strategy has no measurable impact on policy, then every 
strategy is Nash for this voter. Analysis of coalitions of voters is a constructive 
way to overcome not only this problem but, more importantly, the first problem 
of the absence of dominant strategies. 
The "credibility" of coalitions is the third problem we encounter. This 
problem is highlighted as we turn to a discussion of the properties we believe 
should be satisfied by a refinement. 
Given the incentive voters with ideal points in (OD, OR) have to "moderate" 
outcomes, it is intuitive that there can be only two possible equilibrium out- 
comes. In one, D wins the presidency and R is relatively strong in the 
legislature while in the other an R president is balanced by D strength in 
the legislature. Consider the latter case. It is an almost immediate result that in 
equilibrium there will be a cutpoint. OR such that voters with ideal points left of 
OR vote D for the legislature while those to the right vote R. Such a cutpoint is 
shown in Figure 1. Moreover, 0R = xR is the policy outcome if R is president. 
Thus, as demonstrated by Propositions 1 and 2 below, policy must equal the 
ideal point of the pivotal voter. 
Would a coalition of voters "defect" to another outcome? Voters on the left 
of OD, for instance, would want centrist voters now voting R for president to 
switch their presidential vote in order to elect D president. To attract these 
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A Non-credible Coalition 
-The coalition dominates by voting Voters not in the coalition 
D for president and R for the legislature 
These voters do not satfsty (C) These voters These voters 
in votng R ro the legisl ture vote D for the vote a for the In voting A for legislatureure legisatur 
o 8 x = New Policy Outcome R 8 1 
D E)R R 
A Credible Coalition 
_-. 
--The coalition dominates 
-- 
Voters not in the coalition 
_ 
by votng D for president 
These voters vote D These voters vote D These voters 
for the legislature to These voters vote R for the bgislsture 
for the 
seusty (C) for the legislature legislature 
08 x = New Policy Outcome 8 8 1 
D R R 
FIGURE l.-Credible and noncredible coalitions. Both coalitions dominate OR, the only possible 
equilibrium outcome with R president. Condition (C) is given in Proposition 1. 
voters, the extremists on the left of OD would "promise" to vote R for the 
legislature to "moderate" the D president. This construction is described in the 
upper panel of Figure 1. However, the vote switches (deviations) proposed to 
this coalition are not credible: the extremists on the left of OD would want to 
elect D president and vote D for the legislature.1" Thus, in order to dominate 
OR credibly, one must find a coalition of voters that has no incentive to vote 
differently after "defecting." Such a coalition is illustrated in the bottom panel 
of Figure 1. For at least one of the two possible presidential outcomes, 
Proposition 4 demonstrates that majority coalitions of the bottom type fail to 
exist, implying existence of a Nash equilibrium not subject to credible deviations 
by coalitions. 
The coalition proof Nash (CPN) equilibrium concept of Bernheim, Peleg, and 
Whinston (1987) addresses the problem of credible deviations. CPN in essence 
restricts which vote-switching deviations are permitted. The basic idea in CPN 
is that, to be an equilibrium, a strategy constellation z must not only be Nash 
but not subject to challenge from a credible coalition that intemally deviates to 
some z'. 
Bernheim et al. developed CPN only for the case of a finite number of 
players. In this case, the concept can be specified recursively. In a single player 
game, the singleton must be individually rational. For N player games, N > 1, 
assume CPN has been defined for games with fewer than N players. For the N 
11 It will become clear below that this credibility problem applies not only to Oi O 0D, who have a 
weakly dominant strategy, but also to some Oi > OD 
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player game, z is (a) self-enforcing if, for all coalitions with n players, 1 < n < N, 
it is a CPN in the game induced on n by holding the strategies of nonmembers 
to the strategies used in z and (b) CPN if it is both self-enforcing and strictly 
Pareto undominated by any other self-enforcing strategy. 
This definition implies, in somewhat loose terms, that a "proposal" by a two 
person coalition is "stable" if it is not subject to an individually rational 
deviation by its members, that a three person coalition must have a proposal 
that is not subject to either a credible deviation by any two-person coalition or 
to an individual deviation, etc. 
In the context of our previous example, the CPN refinement says that it is not 
self-enforcing for extreme-left voters to "promise" to vote R in the legislative 
election to create a coalition with moderate-left voters who would like to elect 
a D president but only with strong R representation in the legislature. CPN 
rules out such coalitions which are not credible in the sense of not being self- 
enforcing. 
In order to apply the same idea to a continuum of voters, we use Greenberg's 
(1989; 1990, Ch. 7) generalization of the "no credible deviation" approach of 
CPN. We first restate his stability concept, without specific reference to our 
game. 
Let zi be an individual strategy, Zi be i's (nonempty and compact) strategy 
set, ZA the Cartesian product of the Zi, and z an element of ZA, where A 
denotes the set of players. Denote by ui(z) i's utility under z, by S and S' 
non-null"2 subsets of A. Allow " < " to express dominance. 
Consider the abstract system (2, <): 
7? {(S, z)S cA, S 0}. 
For (S', z') and (S, z) in X, 
(S' z') < (S, 7z)*ScS', Ui(Z) >Ui(Z') 
for all i E S and z' = z1 for all l k S. 
The abstract core of the system is the set of undominated elements M, 
_ 
= W A d(>), 
where A(a)={ e7fI<a) and for some subset c , A(C%)a U{A(a)Ia 
Moreover, a set X is a von Neumann-Morgenstem abstract stable set if T= 
2\ A(Z). That is, X is internally stable (for all (S, z) and (T, y) EX, neither 
(S,z) <(T, y) nor (T, y) <(S, z)) and extemally stable (for every (S, z) X, 
3(T,y) E=5X such that (S, z) < (T, y)). 
12 We need only consider non-null subsets since no null subset can affect outcomes and thus 
individual utilities. 
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THEOREM (Greenberg (1989)): For a finite set of players N, if an abstract stable 
set f exists, (N, z) Es' if and only if z is in the set of CPN for the normal form of 
the game defined for N. 
In other words, Greenberg shows a correspondence between abstract stable 
sets and CPN for a finite number of players. Consequently, we use the abstract 
stable set, which is also defined for the continuum, as a generalization of the 
CPN concept. For our model, the abstract stable set has a simple characteriza- 
tion; it is the unique set of pairs that are undominated by members of the 
abstract core. With a slight abuse of terminology we will indicate the pair(s) 
(I, z) in this stable set as CPN equilibria for this game. 
3. EQUILIBRIUM 
3.1. Legislative Elections: A Condition on Dominance 
Let us define VRjz as the legislative vote bliss point for voter i given the 
presidential outcome under z. 
From the single-peakedness of u( ), the following result follows immediately: 
LEMMA 1: For fixed Jz, u( ) is continuous and single-peaked in VR. Bliss points 
VRjz are monotonically increasing in 0. 
We now state an important result concerning voting in legislative elections. 
PROPOSITION 1: A necessary and sufficient condition for (S, z) to be undomi- 
nated by any (T, y) where y1 = z1 is 
(C) Z2 be represented on S by a cutpoint 0 satisfying 
VRz} VR 
PROOF: If (C) is not satisfied, either (a) T = {i: i E S and z2 = D and VRZ < 
VRJz} 0 0 or (b) L = {i: i E S and z2 = R and VRZ > VRJZl 0 0. Without loss of 
generality, assume T 0 0. By continuity and by the single-peakedness of u( ) 
given Jz, there exists a coalition T' c T all of whose members utility would be 
increased were y2 = R, i E T', and y2 = z2, i e T'. So an (S, z) that does not 
satisfy (C) is dominated. 
The proof of sufficiency is immediate. Q.E.D. 
COROLLARY: Any pair (S, z), where z is not a legislative cutpoint strategy on S, is 
dominated by some (T, y), where y satisfies (C) on T. 
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Proposition 1 has the appealing property that there are no voters who would 
like to see a reduction of the share of votes of the party they are voting for in 
the legislative election. 
We now establish a result that resembles the median voter theorem. In 
traditional two party electoral models, policy equals the bliss point of the 
median voter. In our model, policy equals the bliss point of the pivotal voter in 
the legislative election; this is the pivotal voter theorem. Before considering the 
full game, where voters simultaneously choose the executive and the legislature, 
we present this theorem in the context of a restricted game where the president 
is exogenously given and voters choose only the legislature. 
From the continuity and strict monotonicity of the functions H(O) and g( ) on 
[0,1], there are unique solutions for 0 and VR to the following pairs of 
equations: 
(6) I VR= 
1 
-H(0), 
( o=XD = OD +D(VR) 
(7) IVR= 1 -H(O)9 |0= XR= OR -9R(1 -VR)' 
Define OD, OR, respectively, as the solutions for 0 to (6) and (7). 
PROPOSITION 2-Pivotal Voter Theorem: The cutpoint strategy Oj, j E {D, RI, 
represents the unique (I, z) CPN pair in the restricted game where j is president. The 
following holds: 
()OD < OD =XD < OR =XR < OR. (8) 0DOD=xD OR=x< 
PROOF: 1. It is direct to show that 0i satisfies (C) for (I, Oj) and that any (I, z) 
that involves measurable deviations from Oj fails to satisfy (C). 
2. By Proposition 1, there is a unique abstract stable set M* =.W = {(S, z) 
such that (C) is satisfied). 
3. Steps 1 and 2 imply that (I, Oj) is the unique (I, z) CPN pair. 
4. The inequalities (8) follow immediately by noting that if (C) is satisfied for 
OR and if OD 2 OR, (5) implies that (C) cannot be satisfied for OD. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2 holds regardless of the positions of OD and OR relative to the 
median voter; the pivotal voter is always interior to the bliss points of the two 
parties, even if they are both to the same side of the median. 
Conditions (8) establish that the policy outcome equals the ideal point of the 
voter at the legislative cutpoint."3 Every voter to the left of the cutpoint votes D 
13 It should now be clear why we assumed a continuum of voters. A discrete distribution would 
irntroduce t dious but substantively uninteresting problems emerging from the fact that changing one 
vote makes a discrete change in policy. For example, assume there were 100 voters each with a 
distinct ideal point and that the most desirable outcome for voters 68 and 69 from the left would be 
for party D to obtain 68 legislative votes and that voter 70 from the left preferred to see D obtain 67 
votes. Then there would be two equilibria. One where voters 1-68 voted D and 69-100 voted R and 
another which was the same except voter 68 voted R and 69 voted D. 
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and would want a policy further to the left, thus a reduction in VR. A similar 
statement applies to voters to the right of the cutpoint. The cutpoint equilibrium 
results in voters pulling policy away from the incumbent president's bliss point; 
voters moderate the president with the legislature. Since OD < OR a party receives 
more votes for the legislative elections when it does not win the presidency than when 
it does. 
3.2. Simultaneous Choice of Executive and Legislature 
We now analyze the unrestricted game in which voters jointly choose the 
executive and the legislature. We begin with three definitions. Then we charac- 
terize the abstract core. Finally, we show that the abstract stable set (CPN) is 
the set of pairs that are undominated by members of the abstract core. 
DEFINITION: S is pivotal under z if 
1 
u(S) + a?i: i eI\S and z= Jz} > - if J =D, 
2Z ' 
1 
> - if Jz=R. 
That is, pivotal coalitions can change the outcome of the presidential election 
when the votes of nonmembers are unchanged. (Recall that we assume ties go to 
party R.) 
DEFINITION: OT is the supremum of the ideal points of the members of T. 
DEFINITION: xJ is the policy when j is president with legislative vote VRZ. 
The next result shows that, if (C) is satisfied on (S, z) when R is president, the 
pair can only be dominated by a coalition of left voters, more precisely voters 
with bliss points to the left of the policy outcome under z. 
LEMMA 2-Dominating Pivotal Coalitions: If Jz = R and (S, z) < (T, y), (C) 
satisfied for (S, z) implies Oi <XR for all i E T. 
PROOF: 1. Domination and (C) satisfied imply Jy = D. 
2. Assume the contrary. Then 3i E T n (XR, 1] with u(xD, )> u(xR,.). 
Therefore, by single-peakedness XYD >A and T (X, 1]. 
3. Inequality (5) and XD >XR imply VRY> VRZ while (C) satisfied on S 
implies z, = R for all i E T. Contradiction. Q.E.D. 
Given that a "left" coalition must pivot against R president, the next lemma 
gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for the rightmost member of that 
coalition to gain utility in deviating. In turn, if the rightmost member gains, all 
members gain. 
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LEMMA 3: If J, = R and (C) is satisfied on (S, z), (S, z) is dominated if and only 
if 3(T, y), T c S such that 
(i) Jy =D, 
(ii u(x y, OT) 2 U(XZ, 7 00 
(iii) yi =zi, i e T. 
PROOF: Sufficiency. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, to show that all members of 
T are better off, it suffices to focus on voter type OT. If (ii) is satisfied and (iii) is 
satisfied and T c S, the conditions for dominance are satisfied. 
Necessity. Proposition 1 and (C) satisfied imply that (i) is necessary. The 
definition of dominance implies that (iii) is necessary. Since all members of T 
must be better off under y than under z, (ii) is necessary. Q.E.D. 
PROPOSITION 3-The Abstract Core: A pair (S, z) EW if (C) is satisfied and 
(a) S is nonpivotal or (b) S is pivotal for z, and there does not exist (T, y) that 
satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3 if R is president under z or analogous conditions 
if D is president under z. 
PROOF: Follows directly from Proposition 1 and Lemma 3. 
PROPOSITION 4-CPN Equilibria: There is a unique abstract stable set -T= 
7\,Ad(w) that contains at least one CPN pair (I, z). If (I, z) e-, either party R 
wins the presidency and 0R is the cutpoint of the legislative elections or party D wins 
the presidency and OD is the legislative cutpoint. 
PROOF: External Stability-External stability is direct since _W c W\ A(YW). 
Internal Stability-If (S, z) EY6, it is undominated. 
Therefore consider (S, z) Ec but (S, z) M. Assume (S, z) <(T, y) and 
(T, y) E=5YX. Since (C) is satisfied on S, Jy 0 Jz. If (T, y) E-, (T, y) satisfies (C). 
Moreover, the fact that members of T prefer the y outcome to the z outcome 
immediately implies that no T' c T can gain by pivoting back to J,. Hence 
(T, y) eW. But then (S, z) < (T, y) =* (S, z) C<. Contradiction. 
Consequently, all (S, z) E -\ d(w) are internally stable. 
Uniqueness-For every abstract stable set X, _W cZ. By internal stability, 
therefore, fn A(sW) = 0. Therefore, every TCW. But, by the internal stabil- 
ity of -T, any ./T is not externally stable. Hence, -T is the unique abstract 
stable set. 
(I, z) in the CPN-Assume w.l.o.g. that u(OR, ) > u(OD,) and let z be a 
cutpoint strategy represented by 0 < pA, 0R. Claim: (I, z) eX. Assume the 
contrary, implying (I, z) < (T, y) er' with Jy = D and XyD < OD. But by single- 
peakedness u(xj, ,u) < U(OD, ,u) and by assumption u(OD, ,u) < u(OR, ,1u). Hence 
,u e T which contradicts Jy = D. Thus, xZR = OR is a CPN outcome. Q.E.D. 
REMARKS: 1. Ties Are Never Equilibria. Our assumption about the tie-break- 
ing rule is inconsequential. If 0 <P < 1 when MRZ = 1, any pair (I, z) that 
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implies a tied presidential election is not CPN. (See Alesina and Rosenthal 
(1993).) The intuition is that the voters can more effectively moderate the 
executive in the absence of uncertainty about the election. The only CPN 
outcomes have a sure winner. This result holds even with complete symmetry. In 
contrast to the traditional two-candidate model, where complete convergence 
always implies a tie, ties are never equilibria in our model. 
Consider the fully symmetric case provided by P = -, symmetric u( ), g( ), and 
H(O), with OD and OR symmetric about tt. This is the most likely candidate for a 
tied race. With full symmetry, a tie implies 0= ,t. Therefore the policy outcomes 
are more extreme than tR and OD; if D wins the coin toss xD < OD and if R 
wins XR.> A coalition of voters around the median can "dominate" the tie 
by making certain, say, R is president and reinforcing the D delegation in the 
legislature to obtain a more moderate outcome than xD. Some voters below tt 
switch to an R presidential vote and some voters above ,u switch to a D vote for 
the legislature. (Note that this deviation from a tie leads to divided government; 
party R has the presidency and D has a majority in the legislature.) 
2. Conditions for Two vs. One CPN Outcomes. Proposition 4 implies that there 
are either one or two CPN outcomes. For symmetric g( ), H(O), and u( ), if the 
two party ideal positions (OD and OR) are relatively symmetric around the 
median, we have two equilibria (i.e., a D executive with a relatively strong R 
legislative delegation and vice versa). If, instead, D, for example, is much closer 
to the median than R, there is a unique equilibrium with D president. In 
particular, there is a unique CPN when both party ideal points are to the same 
side of the median. 
3. Divided Government. There exist equilibria for which divided government 
occurs; that is, the party winning the presidency does not have a majority in the 
legislature. When there are two CPNs, at least one must have divided govern- 
ment.14 Divided government also can arise when the CPN is unique. 
4. Conditional Sincerity. In a CPN equilibrium at least a bare majority of the 
presidential winner's support must come from voters who, given the legislative 
component of the strategy, prefer the winner. This result follows from the 
structure of the proof of Propositions 3 and 4. Similarly, condition (C) implies 
that, conditional on the presidential vote, all voters must vote sincerely in the 
legislative election. 
3.3. An Example 
We now present an example which leads to closed form solutions and several 
additional results. The same specification forms the basis of the uncertainty 
model in Section 5. 
14 PROOF: For both CPN to have unified government, 6D > i > 6R' which contradicts Proposition 
2. 
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This example assumes symmetric preferences that are uniformly distributed 
on [0,1]. We also assume linear gj(1); gD = kVR, gR = k(1 - VR). This leads to: 
(2') xD = OD +kVR, 
(3) xR = oR-k(1-VR). 
Note that (2') and (3') represent policy as a weighted average of the bliss 
points of the executive and the legislature with the weight a E (0,1) implicitly 
given by: 
k-(1 - a)(OR - D). 
That is, 
(2") xD = aOD + (1 - a)[VROR + (1 - VR)OD], 
(3") xR = aOR + (1 - a)[VROR + (1 - VR)0D]. 
The position of the legislature is also a weighted average, the weights being 
the vote shares of the two parties. Using (2'), (3'), and H uniform, we obtain 
OD + k (9) OD 1 k 
(10) OR= 1 +k' 
1. The Relative Power of the Presidency and the Legislature. If the executive is 
more powerful than the legislature, i.e. a > 2, divided government occurs unless 
the parties are very asymmetrically located with respect to the median. As 
a -) 1, power becomes concentrated in the presidency and only one CPN 
survives for OD + 1 - OR. The case of a = 1 is the standard two-party model 
where the winner is the party closer to the median. In our model, if a-_ 1, this 
party wins the presidency. In the face of an all powerful president, if the party 
bliss points are on opposite sides of the median voter's, the legislature is handed 
to the opposition; the government is always divided. As a -> 0, power becomes 
concentrated in the legislature. Here also there is a unique CPN but with 
unified government. As a -O 0, if, say, R is closer to the median, OR -_ OR7(1 + 
OR- OD) < 2 = A. With R president, voters on the left use the power of the 
legislature to pull policy to the left of the median. 
The basic nature of these observations carries over to the more general gj(-) 
functions. In particular, with a powerful president, strong legislative opposition 
is needed for balancing; thus, divided government becomes more likely. The two 
possible equilibrium outcomes, 0R and 0D' depend only on the gj(C) and H(-). 
Whether both or just one of these outcomes is CPN also depends on the 
"shape" of u( ). 
2. One vs. Two CPN Outcomes. In our example, it is easy to find the 
parameter values which lead to one or two CPN outcomes, with or without 
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divided government. For instance, with a= we have: 
(i) OR = .9, OD = 1= two CPN equilibria, OR = .36, OD = .64, divided govern- 
ment in both. 
(ii) OR = O9 0D = .3 > unique CPN with D president, OD = .46, divided gov- 
ernment. 
(iii) OR = O9 0D = .4 unique CPN with D president, OD = .52, unified gov- 
ernment. 
Case (iii) illustrates that, in the example of this section, there is a unique CPN 
with unified government if both OD and OR are to the same side of the median, 
even if the bliss points are on opposite sides of the median. This result implies 
immediately that, if there are two CPN outcomes, both have divided govem- 
ment, as illustrated by case (i). Case (ii) illustrates that divided government can 
also occur when there is a unique CPN. 
3. Heterogeneous Parties. We can relax the assumption of intra-party homo- 
geneity by allowing the executive (E) and the legislative (L) delegation of the 
same party to have different ideal policies. For simplicity, we continue to assume 
homogeneity within legislative delegations. The ideal policies are denoted 1jh 
where i E {D, RI and h E {E, LI. Thus, the first subscript identifies the party, 
the second identifies the "executive" or the "legislative" branch of the party. We 
assume only the following: 
(11) ODh<oRh' (h=E,L;h'=E,L). 
Thus, in both parties the executive may or may not be more moderate than the 
legislative delegation. If party j holds the executive, policy is given by the 
following generalization of (2") and (3"): 
(12) xi = aOjE + (1-ca)[VRORL + (1 VR)ODL]. 
It can be shown that three basic results obtained in the homogeneous case 
apply here as well: (i) in the case of u( ) symmetric, whichever Oj is closer to the 
median is a CPN equilibrium; (ii) the legislative vote for a party is always higher 
when the party does not control the executive; (iii) for some parameter values 
"divided government" is possible. 
In the homogeneous case, policy outcomes were always in between the ideal 
policies of the two presidents. When does this result continue to hold; that is, 
are presidents moderated by the legislature? To address this question we focus, 
without loss of generality, on the case of D president, the case of R president 
being symmetric. In the more inteyesting case in which the two parties are on 
opposite sides of the median, simple algebraic manipulation then shows that, for 
u( ) symmetric, the president is moderated if any of the following three 
conditions holds: 
(i) 0DE < 3 Executives are always moderated if they are further than 6 from 
the median. 
(ii) ODL + ORL = 1. Executives are always moderated if the legislative parties 
are symmetric about the median. 
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(iii) 0DL 2 ODE. An executive who is more extreme than his legislative party is 
always moderated. 
When none of these conditions hold, the policy outcome may be more 
extreme than the president's ideal point. In this case a "moderate" president 
balances an extreme legislature. 
4. THE TWO PERIOD MODEL 
In the two-period model, the setup is identical to the one-period model except 
that preferences are intertemporally additive with discount factor ,8. In the first 
period, legislative and presidential elections are held simultaneously; in the 
second, the executive remains in office and new legislative elections are held. 
This scenario is intended to capture the structure of elections in the United 
States. 
An individual strategy becomes Zi_z/z7z? where the first two components 
remain as in the one-period model and Z3 E {D; R; D if R president in period 1, 
R if D president in period 1; R if R president in period 1, D if D president in 
period 11.15 
In our characterization of equilibrium behavior in the two-period model, we 
require that the behavior of voters be dynamically consistent. Bernheim et al. 
(1987) combined the concepts of dynamic consistency and coalition-proofness in 
defining perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Here we simply extend 
Greenberg's (1989) dominance concept in a way that is directly analogous to the 
development of Bernheim et al.,16 as follows. 
Let y be the generic index for subgames (including the game itself), and let 
z(y) be the restriction of z to the subgame. 
For (S', z') and (S, z) in X, 
(S', z') < (S, z) 
(i) SCS', 
(ii zi = z, for all I 0 S, 
(iii) ui(z(y)) ? ui(z'(y)) for all i E S in every subgame y, with strict 
inequality in at least one subgame. 
Conditions (i) and (ii) repeat Greenberg's definition of dominance. Condition 
(iii) adds dynamic consistency to Greenberg's specification. For dominance to 
occur, there must be at least one subgame in which all members of S are better 
off with z than with z'. In addition, there can be no subgame in which any 
member of S is worse off. In our game, there are two subgames, one corre- 
15 It is unnecessary to condition Z3 on the t = 1 vote shares, since the presidential share does not 
affect utilities and the legislature is entirely reelected in period 2. 
16 In this paper, we do not attempt to prove that the abstract stable set for our dominance 
relation is, parallel to Greenberg (1989), isomorphic with the perfectly coalition-proof Nash 
equilibria. 
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sponding to the second period with a D president, the other to R president. 
Proposition 2, the pivotal voter theorem, gives the unique CPN outcome in each 
subgame. Note that even if z implies R president, z will be dominated if it does 
not satisfy a C condition in the second period for D president. 
With no uncertainty about preferences, in equilibrium the outcome of the 
presidential election is known before the first-period elections. Since no infor- 
mation is revealed by the first-period elections, voter behavior does not change 
in the second period. This implies that the equilibrium cutpoints in the legisla- 
tive elections in the two periods are identical. 
PROPOSITION 5: In equilibrium the legislative vote is identical in both periods. 
More precisely, in the Appendix we show that the results of Proposition 4 
extend to the two-period case. The two-period stable set (I, z) pair(s) are 
identical to those of Proposition 4 with the addition that the first-period 
legislative component OR or OD is repeated in the second period. The proof 
requires two technical restrictions. One is that policies with a D president are 
always to the left of policies with a R president. The other is that preferences 
follow a single-crossing property. 
Proposition 5 implies that there is no midterm cycle with complete information. 
5. THE MODEL WITH UNCERTAINTY: THE MIDTERM CYCLE 
5.1. The Model with Incomplete Infornation 
This section considers the case in which the distribution of voters' preferences 
is perturbed by a random shock. The presence of this form of uncertainty will 
cause some voters to alter their legislative votes over the two periods, leading to 
a midterm cycle. 
We assume intertemporally additive, quadratic preferences for both parties 
and voters: 
1 2 
(13) Ui =-_ E: 13t-l(xt - i9) i = D, R, i. 
2t=l 
We also assume H(O) uniform and the linear policy functions given in (2') and 
(3'). Quadratic preferences imply the single-crossing property assumed in the 
two-period complete information model. Also as with the two-period complete 
information case, we assume that policies with D president are always to the 
left of those with an R president; this is equivalent to assuming a ? 2. 
The extremes of the uniform distribution of voters ideal points are given by 
I, = [at, 1 + at] where the at are i.i.d. for all t as 
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Thus, for any realization of a (henceforth the time subscript is omitted when 
unnecessary) there is always a constant proportion (OR - OD) of the electorate 
with ideal points in the interval [GD, OR]. The distribution of a is "common 
knowledge," but voters cannot communicate their preferences to each other.'7 
Moreover, even though the realization of a, is automatically revealed by the 
observed results of the t = 1 elections, the assumption of independence implies 
that we have no learning in the game. 
Greenberg (1989) does not define . for a game of incomplete information, 
but we make a natural generalization. We define coalitions with respect to voter 
types that can lie in the interval I, = [- w, 1 + w]. Domination (<) is defined 
relative to the expected utility of each type in the coalition. 
Note that, generically, the set of voters differs in the two time periods. For 
example, if a2 > a,, there are voters in the interval [a,, a2) in the first period but 
not in the second and voters in the interval (1 + a,, 1 + a2] in the second period 
but not the first. Since all period 1 voters who risk not participating in period 2 
have weakly dominant strategies, the analysis below is unaffected by having 
some players participate for only one period.18 
5.2. Voting in Legislative Elections 
We begin by considering the legislative elections at t = 2. The analysis 
parallels Section 3.1. The vote for the legislature, which now depends on the 
realization of a, is denoted VR(a). The expected second-period utility of voter i, 
with a bliss point Oi such that OR < Oi < OD when R is president is given by 
w 1 2 1 (15) E0u J - -(OR-k(1-VR(a))-G.) -da. I 2 '2w 
An analogous expression for Eu/D holds if D is president. Voters with bliss 
points Oi < w or Oi > 1 - w, can update by observing their own preferences. But 
the inequalities in (14) imply that these voters have dominant strategies for 
every realization of a: they always vote RR or DD respectively. Thus, their 
updating does not affect the equilibrium analysis. 
17 One might be concerned that, if coalitions can be formed, communication must be possible. We 
argue, however, that communication is unimportant in our model. The only preferences that are 
unknown are those of voters with weakly dominant strategies. These voters always have an interest 
in not revealing their existence since they always have an interest in having the other voters behave 
as if there were very few of them. Thus any cheaptalk will be babble. Communication is but a small 
part of the more general issue of how coalitions are formed in very large electorates. We only view 
CPN as an "as if' description of tacit processes in elections. 
18 The varying players interpretation of the models can be motivated by the assumption that 
electoral participation is predominantly driven by nonvoting from alienation (Hinich and Ordeshook 
(1969); Rosenthal and Sen (1973)) where nonvoters are disproportionately extremists. But it would 
fail to take into account nonvoting by indifferent middle-of-the-road voters. The set of voters would 
not change if we permitted a shock to occur only in the first period. The first-period vote reveals the 
shock a to the electorate which then plays the second period with complete information. None of 
our results would change qualitatively with this formalization, but the algebra and the presentation 
would be somewhat more cumbersome. 
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In the Appendix, we show that (14) and the assumption of quadratic prefer- 
ences allow us to express the relevant indirect preferences in terms of expected 
votes. Let EVR2Zj denote the expected vote at t = 2 when j has won the 
presidency at t = 1. Let EVR21j denote voter i's indirect bliss point; 0j2 is a 
legislative cutpoint in period 2 when party j holds the presidency. 
PROPOSITION 6 (Pivotal Voter Theorem for Incomplete Information): A nec- 
essary and sufficient condition for (S, z) to be undominated by any (T, y) where 
y1 =z1 and y2 =z2 is that: 
(C2) z3 (second-period component) be represented on S by cutpoints 1j2 
satisfying: 
EVR2(j }EVR2 i if Oi - 2 
Moreover: 
9R*2 = 9R = k is the cutpoint of any CPN at t = 2 for R president; 1 ? k 
- - OD + k 
oD2 = o = 1 + k is the cutpoint of any CPNat t = 2 forD president; 
aR 
x R2 = 1 k + ka2 is the policy with a R president; 
0 + k 
xD2= D + ka2 is the policy with a D president; 1 ? k 
0R2 = E(X2); D2 E(xD2). 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
The analogy with the complete information case is that the expected policy is 
equal to the ideal policy of the pivotal voter (0R*2 or OD*2). 
Let us now turn to the first-period election. Let EVR1 denote i's expected vote 
bliss point for the legislative elections at t = 1 given the presidential component 
of z. (Note that the separability of (13) and the assumption that the entire 
legislature is elected in both periods imply that the t = 1 legislative bliss point 
depends on presidential voting only and not on expectations concerning the 
second period.) Let Pz be the ex ante probability that R is president, that is the 
probability when all voters believe that z will be the strategy but do not know 
a.19 Note that 
191 A 
19 Note that if 0 is a presidential cutpoint in z, Prob(MRZ = = 0, implying that the tie-breaking 
rule is inconsequential. 
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For the first period, Proposition 6 and the results developed in the certainty 
model can be directly extended to show the following. 
LEMMA 4: A necessary and sufficient condition for (S, z) to be undominated by 
any (T, y) where y1 = z1 and y3 = z3 is that 
(C2) z2 (first-period legislative component) be represented on S 
by a cutpoint 0 satisfying: 
EVR z\ {}EVRi if Oi(=}0. 
LEMMA 5: 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for (I, z) to be undominated 
by any (T, y) where y differs from z only in the t = 1 legislative component is that 
the t = 1 legislative component of z be the cutpoint 0(z), given by 
(16) 0(z)=PZ0R+(1 -PZ)0D 
2. If z has a presidential cutpoint 0, 
1 
OffR 0 < 2 - w (P6, = 1), 2 
(2 + -0) 
(17) 60() +w - (O - k - OD) + OD + k 
(1+k) (0<P6<1), 
OD S 2 +w < 0 (P = ?). 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
The next result follows immediately from Lemma 5. 
PROPOSITION 7: Given 0 < Pz < 1, a necessary condition for nondomination of 
(I, z) is that z be represented by a unique legislative cutpoint 0(z) at t = 1 
satisfying 
(18) 6D*2 < 0 (Z) < 61R2- 
The intuition of this result is straightforward. If, say, 0(z) < 0D2, then voters 
with bliss points Oi such that 0(z) < oi < 0D2' under uncertainty about the 
president's identity, vote R for the legislature in the first period. This implies 
that they would want to "moderate" a D president despite the fact that they are 
taking the risk of making a R president less constrained, if R wins. Then, in the 
second period, when they know that a D president is in office, they switch to 
This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Sat, 7 Jun 2014 15:22:45 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THEORY OF DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 1331 
voting D for the legislature, reducing the moderation of the D president. Thus 
0< D*2 cannot be an equilibrium. Analogous argument rules out 
- 
> 
Note, from (16), that if P, = 1 (or P, = 0), we have 0(z) = -R2 (or 0(z) = OD*2). 
Thus, with no uncertainty about the presidential outcome, the legislative cut- 
points are the same in both periods; as in the complete information model, we 
do not have (in expectation) a midterm cycle. In contrast, with uncertain 
presidential elections, satisfying (C2) implies a midterm congressional cycle: the 
party of the president always has lower expected plurality in midterm legislative 
elections than in the legislative elections held at the same time as the presiden- 
tial elections. 
5.3. Presidential Voting 
Let us now turn to the presidential vote. If 0 < P2 < 1, there is a critical value 
of a above which party R wins the presidency and obtains a relatively high vote 
for the legislature. The expected utility of a voter is obtained by integrating out 
over a, switching from D to R president at the critical value. (See Appendix.) 
A voter will vote for R for president if and only if his expected utility, E!jR, 
conditional on R president is greater than his expected utility, EUiD, conditional 
on D president.20 That is, a sufficient condition for domination is as follows. 
LEMMA 6: If 0 < Pz < 1, (S, z) is dominated if (Cp) is not satisfied on S: 
(CP) Let SR = {i: i E S and z' = R}. If or (SR) > 0, EUR >EUD 
for all i ESR 
Let SD = {i: i E S and z' = D}. If or(SD) > 0, EUR <EUD 
for all i E SD 
PROOF: Without loss of generality, assume there exists measurable T ={i: 
i E S and zI = R, EJD>EULR). E Then, since 0 < Pz < 1, expected utility is 
increased for all members of T if they adopt yl = D, yi = z2, y3 = Zi. Q.E.D. 
Equating the two expected utilities in (CP), for t = 2 legislative cutpoints OR*2 
and OD2 and arbitrary t = 1 cutpoint 0, we find, by use of (B-3) in the Appendix, 
the election cutpoint 0, as a function of 0: 
A (0D+ oR)( + (1 + k)) +13k-2k(1+k) 0 (19) o(o) = 2(1 +2)(- + ,8) ' OD < 0 < OR' 
We now develop an important condition on the presidential strategy compo- 
nents given the legislative vote. 
20 Note that a given strategy z partitions the values of a, such that R (D) is elected president for 
a, greater (less) than a threshold value. The expectation of utility for R (D) president is taken over 
these values. 
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LEMMA 7: Given that the legislative components of strategies are 0, OD2' 4R2 a 
necessary condition for (I, z) with 0 < P, < 1 to be undominated by any (T, y) is 
that the presidential component of z be represented by the cutpoint 0 given by (19). 
PROOF: Given fixed strategy components satisfying 0, OR2 and OD*2 all voter 
types O,{10 strictly prefer {R} president to I'}. This observation and 0 <Pz < 1 
renders the proof immediate. Q.E.D. 
When uncertainty persists (0 <Pz < 1), Propositions 6 and 7 and Lemma 7 
imply that (Iw, z) is undominated only if all voters are conditionally sincere in 
both legislative and presidential elections. 
Since 0() is monotone on (OD, OR) and 0(f) is monotone on (OD, OR), it is 
immediate to show that (19) and (17) have at least one solution. Because (19) is 
linear and (17) piecewise linear, there may be one, three, or, at a knife's edge, 
infinite solutions. Intuitively, if uncertainty is low, one is essentially in the 
complete information case, and the only stable solutions will be the exterior 
ones shown in panels (b) and (c) of Figure 2. If uncertainty is high, there can be 
a unique "mid-term cycle" (0 < P < 1) solution illustrated by the unique inter- 
section in panel (a). 
The necessary condition for a unique interior intersection, found in the 
relative slopes of (17) and (19), is 
(20) w > 2(1R-p -k2) 
PROPOSITION 8: If (20) is satisfied and (17) and (19) have a solution with 
0 <P(0) < 1, an abstract stable set V = W\ A(w) exists. The unique pair of the 
form (I, z) must have t = 2 cutpoints OR2 and oD2 and t = 1 cutpoints * and 0*, 
given by the unique solution of (17) and (19). 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
REMARKS: 1. When Is the Outcome of the Presidential Election Uncertain? If 
a = 1, (20) is satisfied for all w > 0. If the president is all powerful, voters have 
no incentive to coordinate their votes in the first period. As the legislature's 
power increases and a falls to its minimum value of 2 the critical value of w 
increases. The increased incentive to coordinate means that more uncertainty in 
preferences is required before the presidential outcome is uncertain. Uncertain 
outcomes are nonetheless predicted for a wide range of parameter values. An 
example is shown in panel (a) of Figure 2. 
2. The Midterm Cycle. If 0 < Pz < 1, we expect a midterm cycle. Furthermore, 
the expected loss in midterm is higher the more unexpected was the presidential 
victory. The actual size of the midterm loss depends also on the realization of a. 
The probability of a reversal of the midterm loss due to the realization of a is 
small. Indeed one can readily find parameter values for which the probability of 
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FIGURE 2.-Equilibrium under uncertainty. The 8) and 0) graphs indicate how the cutpoint 
for one election depends on the cutpoint for the other election. When the 0(6) line intersects a 
vertical segment of the 6(0) graph, the intersection represents an equilibrium for which the 
presidential outcome is certain. 
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a reversal is 0 even though the vote in each period is subject to random 
variation. 
3. Split-ticket Voting. If and only if OR + OD = 1 is there no split-ticket voting 
in the first-period election. In this case only, simple algebra on (17) and (19) 
establishes that 0 * = 2- 
If 08 >2, that is P: < 2, the equilibrium implies three types of voters: 
RR, DR, DD. If 0* < 4 the three types are RR, RD, DD. Thus the voters who 
split their ticket are always a fraction of those voting for the presidential 
candidate more likely to win. In addition, the less uncertain is the presidential 
election (i.e. the larger lo^* - 21), the larger the fraction of split tickets. 
4. Divided Government. The government may be divided in both periods by 
split-ticket voting in period 1 or only become divided in period 2 as a result of 
the midterm cycle. 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper extends the spatial theory of voting to an institutional structure in 
which policy choices depend upon not only the executive but also the composi- 
tion of the legislature. Although voting is conditionally sincere for both the 
legislature and the executive, voters act strategically with respect to their 
simultaneous choices in the two contests. 
Our model has several testable implications which are consistent with some 
observations of voting behavior in democracies in which the executive is directly 
elected. With respect to the United States, for instance, the model predicts: (a) 
split-ticket voting; (b) for some parameter values, a divided government with 
different parties controlling the executive and holding a majority in the legisla- 
ture; and (c) the midterm electoral cycle. 
Four caveats are worth noting. 
First, even though evidence of ticket splitting is widespread (Fiorina (1990)), 
there is also ample evidence of coattail effects, that is a successful presidential 
candidate helps candidates of the same party running for Congress (Calvert and 
Ferejohn (1983); Erikson (1990)). Our model induces coattails via the random 
variable a. For example, a high realization of a corresponds to an unusually 
right-wing electorate that produces party R successes in both presidential and 
congressional elections that are observationally equivalent to "coattails" out- 
comes. At the same time, split-tickets occur and a midterm cycle is expected, 
both as a result of regression to the mean in the random process and as a 
consequence of the systematic adjustment of legislative cutpoints. 
The second caveat is the very persistence of the midterm cycle. The presiden- 
tial election resolves only the uncertainty about the president's identity. In the 
two years between the presidential election and the midterm election, the voters 
acquire further information about presidential competency, personality, and 
policies. These additional resolutions of uncertainty could, in principle, go either 
way and invert the midterm cycle. But the midterm cycle persists not only in the 
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presence of these other sources of information but also in those cases, such as 
1964, 1972, and 1984, when there was little uncertainty about who would win the 
presidency. 
The third caveat pertains to a variety of ways in which the structure of 
legislative elections in the United States differs from the national proportional 
representation in a unicameral egislature we used to make the model tractable. 
In actual practice, of course, individual legislators represent geographic con- 
stituencies in a bicameral legislature, with elections marked by considerable 
incumbency advantage (Fiorina (1989)). In this context, we can interpret the 
midterm cycle in two complementary ways. The first argues that the cycle 
manifests itself in "marginal" districts in which incumbents of the president's 
party are not reelected. The second interpretation, more directly applicable to 
our model, views the midterm cycle as a way in which the voters indicate their 
preferences by reducing the margin of victory of reelected incumbents. These 
smaller majorities, coupled with shifts in marginal seats, constitute a powerful 
signal of "moderation" which voters send to the president and members of 
Congress. 
Fourth, the absence of policy convergence is built into our model since the 
positions of the parties are fixed. However, our results concerning balancing, 
divided government, and the midterm cycle would not disappear in a model 
where ideological parties can choose their positions, as in work by Wittman 
(1977), Calvert (1985), and Roemer (1992).21 As shown by these authors, in the 
absence of a legislature, presidential candidates in general choose separate 
positions. The introduction of a legislature leads, as we have shown, to a policy 
that is more moderate than the position of the president. This moderation, since 
it is anticipated by the parties, creates an incentive for parties to choose even 
less convergent platforms than those chosen without a legislature (Alesina and 
Rosenthal (1995, pp. 127-136). 
Despite these caveats, our model makes some steps toward a more realistic 
characterization of the political system of the United States than the traditional 
"winner takes all" model developed by Hotelling, Black, and Downs. Our 
modeling strategy was also stimulated by the observation that the political 
systems of other nations are even more remote from the standard two-party 
competitive model. First, in parliamentary democracies, relative shares of votes 
generally matter for policy outcomes. Second, various institutions which lead to 
some sort of "checks and balances" are common, even beyond presidential 
systems such as the United States, France, and Venezuela. For example, many 
federal systems leave significant policy-making powers in the hands of provincial, 
regional, or local government units. In such cases it would be possible to 
balance, at least partially, a, say, right-wing national government with left-wing 
21 If parties are only electorally motivated, our model would be uninteresting since, even with our 
institutional structure, electoralist parties would converge to the median. 
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administrations at lower levels. The basic logic of our model provides a stepping 
stone toward the analysis of institutional setups richer than the traditional 
two-party model. 
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APPENDIX 
In the text, we proved that J= W\.~ for the case of one period, complete information, and tied 
presidential races awarded to one party, e.g. PI = 1 if MRZ =R . The generalization to 0 ? Pz ? 1 is 
covered in Alesina and Rosenthal (1993). In Section A, we generalize the proof to the two-period 
model with P = 1 if MRZ = 2. In Section B, we treat the two-period model with incomplete 
information using specific functional forms. 
As a preliminary, we discuss why mixed strategies need not be considered. It is immediate to show 
that (S, z) is dominated by some (T, y) E B for any z with measurable mixed legislative components 
on S. Similarly, assume there is (S, z) where S contains voters who, conditional on the legislative 
components, prefer R to D for president and are mixing on the presidential component. If they can 
increase the probability of election of their preferred party, the mixing is dominated by a (T, y) E B. 
A similar statement would apply to those who prefer D to R. Moreover, if (S, z) < (T, y) and (T, y) 
involves mixing, (S, z) < (T, y'), where y' uses pure strategies on T. Consequently, the only mixing 
that would be in X= W\?W would be nonpivotal mixing in presidential components. Such mixed 
strategies would not affect the policy outcomes associated with X. Therefore, allowing for mixed 
strategies would not alter our substantive conclusions. 
A. The Two-Period Model with P, = 1 if MRZ =2 
The proof requires two assumptions that restrict the institutional structure and preferences 
considered in the one-period model. 
B1. We assume that for all z, y, xRt >XDt, t = 1,2. 
This assumption says that the president's power is always at least as great as the legislature's. For 
(2") and (3"), Bi is equivalent to a 2 2. 
B2. Single-Crossing Property (SCP). Let (xi, x2) and (x", x2' ) be altemative two-period policies. 
We assume that either one policy pair is preferred by all voters or there is a unique indifferent type 8 with 
opposite preferences on opposite sides of 8. 
Define VR2 as the first-period legislative vote for R, VR1iz as the first-period legislative vote bliss 
point for voter i given the presidential outcome under z, VR as the second-period legislative vote 
for R in the second-period subgame corresponding to j president, and VRX'i as the second-period 
legislative vote bliss point for voter i in the subgame. 
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PROPOSITION A-1: Necessary and sufficient conditions for (S, z) to be undominated by any (T, y) 
where y' =zl are 
(C') z2 (first-period legislative component) be represented on S by a cutpoint Q satisfying 
VR1z {}VR1iJz if O ( ; 
(C2) Z3 (second-period legislative component) be represented on S by 
two cutpoints z,j = D, R, satisfying: 
V2i j(_)V2 ij if (-)o 
PROOF: Directly parallel to Proposition 1 in the text. 
Note that the "subgame" part of the definition of dominance prevents domination via adjustment 
of legislative cutpoints if C' and C2 are satisfied. 
The definition of S pivotal is the same as in the one-period model in the text. Lemmas and 
propositions are numbered to correspond to lemmas in the text. 
LEMMA A-2 (No Flip-Flops): If (S, z) <(T, y) where (S, z) and (T, y) satisfy C1 and C2 and 
Jz = R and Jy = D, there does not exist (T', y') that satisfies C1 and C2 such that (T, y) < (T', y') and 
Jy = R. 
PROOF: 1. C2 satisfied implies x2 =X2,. 
2. C1 satisfied, (5) in the text, and T' C T c S imply xyR > XZ, where, for example, xyR 
represents the policy were R elected president with the y first-period legislative vote. 
3. BI and B2 imply T c [0, Oyz) where Oyz is the voter type indifferent between the y policies and 
the z policies. 
4. Let Oyy, denote the type indifferent between y and y'. Since by part 2 XYR 2 Z and by part 1 
x2 ,=x2, 0yy) 2 Oyz. This fact contradicts T' c T. Q.E.D. 
Given that a "left" coalition must pivot against R president (from step 3 of the proof of Lemma 
A-2), the next lemma gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for the rightmost member of that 
coalition to gain utility in deviating. In turn, if the rightmost member gains, all members gain, by B2. 
LEMMA A-3: If Jz = R and C1 and C2 are satisfied on (S, z), (S, z) is dominated if and only if 
3(T, y), T c S such that 
01) Jy =D, 
(ii) u(xDl, oT) + fu(xD2, 61T)>u(xRl 0T)+PU(XR2,0T), 
(iii) Yi= Zi, ie?T, 
(iv) y33 = 3 
PROOF: Sufficiency. By step 3 in the proof of Lemma A-2 and B2, to show that all members of T 
are better off, it suffices to focus on voter type OT. If (ii) is satisfied and (iii) is satisfied and T C S, 
the conditions for dominance are satisfied. 
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Necessity. Proposition A-1 and (C) satisfied imply that (i) is necessary. The definition of 
dominance implies that (iii) is necessary. Since all members of T must be better off under y than 
under z, (ii) is necessary. Condition (iv) is necessary by the dynamic consistency requirement for 
dominance given in the text. Q.E.D. 
PROPOSITION A-3-The Abstract Core: Similar to the one-period model. 
PROPOSITION A-4-CPN Equilibria: There is a unique abstract stable set (CPN) X* = 7\ 1(W) 
that contains at least one CPN pair (I, z). If (I, z) G.V, either party R wins the Presidency and OR is 
the outcome in both periods or D wins the Presidency and OD is the outcome in both periods. 
PROOF: External stability, uniqueness, and (I, z) in the CPN are directly parallel to the proof of 
Proposition 4 in the text. 
Intemal Stability: If (5, z) E.-R, it is undominated. 
Therefore consider (5, z) ET but (5, z) eg. Assume (5, z) < (T, y) and (T, y) E.T. Since C' 
and C2 are satisfied on 5, Jy #Jz. If (T, y) E.V, (T, y) satisfies C' and C2. Moreover, by Lemma 
A-2, no T' c T can gain by pivoting back to Jz. Hence (T, y) E.-'. But then (5, z) < (T, y) => (5, z) 
e.T Contradiction. 
Hence, all (5, z) E 7/1A(.q) are internally stable. Q.E.D. 
B. The Incomplete Information Model 
We maintain the definition of dominance used in the two-period model with complete informa- 
tion. We also maintain Bi. SCP is implied by quadratic utility. 
We begin by generalizing the (CP) condition in the text to 0 <Pz < 1. Let oa(S) denote the 
measure of S conditional on the realization of a. 
(CP) (S, z) is dominated if not for alliES: 
if 0 <P, < 1, 
identical to text; 
if P, = 0, 
min aa({i E 5, z/ =D and EUR <EbiD}) + oa({i EI\S and z2 =D}) > -; 
ae[-w, +wl 
if P = 1, 
mmn oa({i ES, zJl = R and EbR > EUUDI) + oa({i EI\S and zJ = RD)> -. 
ae[-w, +w] 
Note that for any strategy s such that voters at or to the left of OD always vote D and at or to the 
right of OR always vote R, we can express the legislative vote for a contest as 
(B-1) VR =EVR +a 
and the presidential vote as 
(B-2) MR = EMR + a 
where E denotes the expected vote. 
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Consider, then, the expected utility for voter i: 
if --w <EMR <2 +W, 
2 (fEMR[ 
+,8 (R -k+keVR +ka2 - i)2 da da 
__ 2w a2j2 a 




(OD +kEVR2D +ka2- 2 d]d} 
- 1 (w - +EM + E M 
2R[8(OR +22VR i2] 
= _ _ ( 2 R ~[ ( OR -k + kEVR -? - + Rk + ER R_O 
+ w ? [(EOD + kEVJ 
_- 
i)2 + 3(OD + kEVI2D - i)2] 
1 
2W(13 )} 
+ 2 (w -( 2-EMR) )(OR-OD -k + 
- 
and where the notation "2R" and "2D" denotes that the expected second-period vote will depend 
on the outcome of the presidential election. 
It can be seen that (B-3) is a function solely of the parameters of the model, the voter's ideal 
point, and the expected votes for the various contests, and is quadratic in the expected votes. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: 1. It is immediate to show that (S, z) undominated implies that for all 
iESfn[-w,OD], z3=D and for all iESfn[OR,l +w], z? =R. 
2. Since (B-3) is quadratic, Proposition 6 then follows by arguments directly parallel to the proofs 
of Propositions 1 and 2. Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 5: Equation (16) follows directly from (B-3) and a uniform by substituting 
using Pz = (w - 2 + EMR)/2w. Equation (17) then follows directly from (16). Q.E.D. 
LEMMA B-2 (No Flip-Flops): If (S, z) < (T, y) where (S, z) and (T, y) satisfy C1 and C2 and CP 
and Py <Pz, there does not exist (T',y') that satisfies C1 and C2 and CP such that (T,y) < (T',y') 
andPy, > Py. 
PROOF: 1. First consider S = I. In this case, Cl and CP satisfied permit substitution of 6 = 1 - 
EMR and 6 = 1 - EVRJ in (B-3). Use (17) to eliminate 6 from (B-3). Routine differentiation and 
simplification then shows that given Bi and Cp: 
dEui - 2 < ^ (B-4) dO - 0 if 6. - 0. 
(In other words, if Py < Pz and (I, z) < (T, y) with C conditions satisfied, individuals at the left-end 
of the policy space (i = -w, for example) must be better off. This and SCP establish that S must be 
a left coalition.) 
2. The same can be shown for Scl, except that the vote and cutpoint expressions must be 
adjusted for the strategies of voters in I\S. The weak inequalities in (B-4) allow not only for P = 0 
and P = 1 but also for the fact that S cI is not restricted to being a connected set. 
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3. Now assume Py, > Py. Equation (B-4) implies that OT prefers y to any y' that satisfies C' and 
C2 on T'. 
4. Moreover, if OT does better than under y with any y' with Py > Py that satisfies C' and C2 
on T' c T, the first-period legislative cutpoint for T' and PY, must be greater than the cutpoint for 
T and Py. But this contradicts T' c T and C' and C2 satisfied. 
5. Since the utility of OT cannot be improved with Py, > Py, (T, y) < (T', y') cannot be satisfied. 
Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8: Uniqueness and external stability have identical arguments as in the 
complete information case. 
Intemal Stability: Internal stability also obviously holds for (S, z) e. 
Consider (S, z) EX, Cl, C2, and CP satisfied but (S, z) eW. 
W.l.o.g. assume (S, z) < (T, y), Py < Pz, and Cl, C2, and CP satisfied for (T, y). 
1. Lemma B-2 implies that there does not exist (Tt,y') EX such that (T,y) <(T',y') and 
PyI > Py 
2. Therefore assume Py, <P. If (S, z) < (T, y) and (T, y) <(", y'), it follows that all E T 
prefer y' to z. Moreover, C', C , and Cp satisfied imply that z, y, and y' are cutpoint on S, T, and 
T' respectively with Oy, < Oy < Q, and Oy6 > Oy > Q. It follows that if T' is able to dominate y with y' 
it is also able to dominate z using y' in T'. Hence (S, z) < (T', y'). Consider then, of all (T, y) that 
dominate (S, z) and satisfy C', C2, and Cp, the pair with the minimal value of Py. This pair must 
belong to W7. We have shown a contradiction, (S, z) ?X. 
(Iw, z) in -Z. Equations (17), (19), and (20) are satisfied by assumption, with 0 < P < 1. Thus, there 
is a unique (I, z) which could possibly be in -X. It is represented by the four cutpoints 
8*, o *, R2*, D2*. We must show that (I, z) is undominated by any (S, y) E.-'. Such (S, y) must 
keep the second-period strategies constant and change (in S) both first-period cutpoints. 
Without loss of generality, assume 8* > 8*. 
Consider a deviation that can be represented by Oy > 8*. Since the type at Oy has a strict 
preference for a R president at 6*, 6*, this type cannot be better off at OY unless there is a change 
in the first-period legislative vote of the form 6 < 0*. The C' condition can be met by a deviating 
coalition S = [6,y I,] as long as ,,> 6(@,) given by (17). For all such 8y, (20) guarantees that, in (19), 
00y) < by, which implies that C is not satisfied on S. A similar argument applies to ,y < 6*. Hence, 
(I, z) is undominated by an element of W7, implying (I, z) eX. Q.E.D. 
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